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Summary: 
In this paper we argue that product lifecycle theory, which underlies theories of technical 
innovation across the social sciences, is undermined if products are modular. 
Abstract: 
Product lifecycle theory, which underlies theories of technical innovation in economics, 
strategy, marketing, and operations management, is based implicitly on the assumption 
that products are integrated wholes.  The modularization of products undermines the 
specific synergies which drive the product lifecycle, and this undermining has impacts 
spanning from the structure of individual organizations to the structure of economies and 
the definition of industries. (62 words) 
Modularity and the product lifecycle 
In the first decade of the 20th century the three-way competition between gasoline-
powered, steam-powered, and battery-powered electric vehicles was won by gasoline.  
This led to a massive shakeout in the world automobile industry and the gasoline-
powered vehicle became the dominant design (1).  A century later, a similar competition 
is emerging, but this time between fuel-cell-powered electric vehicles, gasoline-powered 
electric vehicles (hybrids), and gasoline-powered vehicles.  While fuel-cell-powered 
vehicles will most likely win the competition, there is no sign this victory will cause any 
shakeout whatsoever.    
The product lifecycle model, with its premise about the synchronicity of innovation and 
market development is one of the most widely accepted frameworks for research on the 
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management of technological innovation and pervades research in management strategy 
(e.g. 2, 3-6) industrial economics (e.g. 7, 8-11), marketing (e.g. 12, 13) and operations 
management (e.g. 14).  The idea of an industry being built around a core product (e.g. 
automobiles, computers) is implicit within the theory and pervades research throughout 
the social sciences. 
Authors in this tradition would explain the shakeout in the first instance, but not in the 
second, by labeling the first technological change as "competence destroying" (5, 6) and 
the second as "competence enhancing" (5, 6).    However, given that the changes are 
technically homologous, this explanation seems hollow.  In this paper we will argue that 
in the second instance, the automobile technology has become highly modular (15, 16), 
and as such, notions of competence destruction, competence enhancement, and the 
product lifecycle have declining relevance.  We will elaborate this basic thesis – that 
modularization undermines the product lifecycle – with examples from the automobile, 
personal computer, and construction industries. 
Products on a continuum from integrated to modular 
An end-product is a set of components that are linked together so as to be useable as a 
relatively stand-alone unit by an end-user.2  Products vary on a continuum from 
integrated to modular (17, 18).   
In essence, a modular system is built of parts so that their internal complexity is hidden 
from other parts and from the environment external to the system (19, 20).  A module is a 
component of a modular system, and an interface is a set of formal well-codified rules 
                                                 
2 This definition has high heuristic value, but surprisingly little analytical value.  For instance, while we 
think of a printer as being a "product", a printer has very limited use unless attached to a computer.   
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that define how modules interact with each other.  The set of interfaces that make up a 
modular system is its architecture. A system is modular in as far as its architecture 
supports the substitutability of modules (18, 21-23), with more modular systems 
supporting more substitutions.  Domestic construction is highly modular in that virtually 
all of the components can be used across architectures with no modification (bricks, nuts, 
bolts, refrigerators, cisterns, windows), or minimal modification (beams, plasterboard, 
wires, floorboards), and can be substituted for each other (steel beams for wood, carpet 
for linoleum, wooden windows for Aluminum etc.) 
While modular products are non-specifically synergistic, integrated products have 
synergistically specific interfaces (18).   In integrated systems, the functionality of the 
system declines if one substitutes one component for another.  In contrast, modular 
products can achieve equivalent or alternative levels of performance if the various 
components are either arranged differently or are substituted.  For example, a user can 
replace the Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) screen on her computer with a Liquid Crystal 
Diode (LCD) display with essentially no change in utility.  Because the CRT screen 
performs as well as it would if it were integrated into the computer, the CRT screen and 
the computer are synergistic.  However, because the user can swap the CRT screen for 
the LCD display, the synergy is not specific to the CRT screen.  The computer is equally 
synergistic with the LCD display.  The CRT screen and the computer are non-specifically 
synergistic.   
Innovation in modular systems 
The non-specific synergies allow four types of innovation in modular systems.  Designers 
can modify a module incrementally (24).  In incremental innovations, neither the core-
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concepts which define the way the technology within the module is constructed nor the 
nature of the interface between this module and other modules changes significantly (24).  
In storage devices for personal computers, most of the 12,000-fold increase in hard drive 
capacity from 5MB in the mid-1980’s to 60 GB today was achieved by progressive 
refinement of the parts or components within the modules, and the way they interact with 
each other.   
Alternatively, designers can replace one module with another – a modular innovation (24, 
25). This is an innovation in which the internal content of the module changes, but the 
interface standard stays the same.  Examples include substituting the second floppy drive 
on the original IBM PC for a hard drive, a record player with a CD player, or a VCR with 
a DVD player (26).    
Third, designers can create an architectural innovation – in which the interface standard 
changes although the core concepts within the modules are preserved (24).  Obvious 
examples include changes in the size of hard drives from 8” to 5.25” to 3.5” to 1.75” 
which have allowed the drives to be used in different ways, changes in the interface 
between the drive and the rest of the computer (e.g. MFM, IDE, SCSI), and the adoption 
of the Universal Serial Bus (USB) which allowed many peripherals (e.g. printers, 
personal organizers) to move from the nine-pin serial port with minimal internal changes.  
Finally, designers can develop new products.  The laptop computer, like the Sparcstation 
and the Macintosh, is a product with a different architecture but functional modules that 
are nearly identical to those in a personal computer. New products are likely to involve 
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new architectures, some new modules, and a number of old modules, some of which have 
been incrementally improved or modified.   
The implications of modularity on the product lifecycle can be derived using an ideal 
type analysis, in which it is assumed that an integrated product obeys product lifecycle 
theory and then the impact of modularization is considered, with the full knowledge that 
real products are neither fully integrated nor fully modular.  We start by summarizing 
contemporary theory of the product lifecycle and showing how it rests on the assumption 
of increasing synergistic specificity, not only between the components of the product, but 
also between the product, the organization which designs it, and the market which 
consumes it.  We then consider how the possibility for modular and architectural 
innovation in modular systems undermines the core predictions of product life cycle 
theory.   
The Product Lifecycle Model 
The product lifecycle and patterns of innovation 
All elaborations of the product lifecycle model (e.g. 3, 4, 6-12) and industry evolution 
models which are based upon it (e.g. 5, 13, 14, 27) rest on the core idea that there is a 
temporal and causal connection between the nature of the market for a product and the 
evolution of the technologies that it embodies (product technologies) and the 
technologies that support and enable it (process technologies).  While the connection 
between product technologies is predicated upon experimentation and learning by and 
about customers and users necessary for the diffusion of a new product, the connection 
with the process technologies is based upon the economics of innovation, from novelty 
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products to mass production and commoditization. The transition from novelty products 
to mass production is marked by the emergence of a dominant design.  
A representative model (3), can be summarized as follows: The evolution of an industry 
begins with the introduction of a novel product by a firm.  The innovation creates a new 
market, so there are no pre-existing links to customers, or it completely reorganizes the 
value chain.  This innovation also requires the firm to master technical competencies that 
did not previously exist in that market space.  This is called an architectural innovation, 
because it “lays down the architecture of the new industry.” (3: 60).3  Because the 
technical capabilities are new, the players in this nascent industry are either all start-ups 
or are players in related industries.  At this stage, the product is still evolving and 
numerous firms participate in its refinement and production, experimenting with features, 
materials and design with a view to creating product configurations that might appeal to 
the market.  The industry is quite attractive economically, with numerous firms sharing in 
the high returns and growing demand.   
Eventually, one player develops a product which integrates technologies and features in 
such a way that it is attractive to a large segment of the market (the dominant design).  
This company is able to achieve a dominant market share (28) and to derive profit 
advantages on the basis of economies of scale.  During the shakeout that follows, 
companies that are able to imitate the dominant design survive and succeed as 
participants in an oligopolistic market (29), while the rest deteriorate and exit the 
industry, retreat to market niches not serviced by the dominant product, or perish.  The 
                                                 
3 Note that the term “Architectural innovation” has two meanings within the literature.  In this case, it refers 
to the creation of a new industry.  For most of this article, an architectural innovation refers to a change in 
the relationship between the modules in a product. 
 8
remaining players produce essentially the same configuration (30-33)  and compete on 
the basis of price and performance (34).   
As competition moves from between-configuration competition to within-configuration 
competition, the locus of innovation moves from product innovation to process 
innovation (2, 35).  Manufacturers become more rigid (36), and price and reliability 
become the main factors that separate winners from losers (e.g. 34).   
Over time, the dominant design is refined in two ways. Along one dimension, new 
platform innovations are developed out of it, creating channels to new customers (niche 
innovations).  On the other, the main design itself gets progressively refined (regular 
innovation), and new product offerings are clustered around it (37).  The act of regular 
innovation, through means such as specialist machinery, economies of scale, and the 
development of closed communities of practice within and between firms (38), erects 
barriers that prevent the owner of the dominant design from detecting novel or emergent 
designs and/or implementing them even if detected. Thus, core competencies become 
core rigidities (36). The market sits wide open for a new entrant to bring a radical 
innovation that, once again, transforms the industry and the competencies that underpin it 
(5, 6, 27, 37).   These processes are summarized in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
The dominant design and synergistic specificity 
The product lifecycle model hinges on the concept of dominant design, or “a specific 
path, along an industry’s design hierarchy, which establishes dominance among 
competing design paths” (39: 49) which drives both the beginning and the end of the 
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product lifecycle.   The adoption of such a design can dramatically affect the nature and 
direction of competition, and the structure and evolution of the industry (2, 39).  At the 
top of the cycle, the emergence of the dominant design leads to the shakeout that 
rationalizes the industry and enables its owners to both build their skills and market 
position (39).  Early authors emphasized the role of specialization, scale economies (3), 
and embedded competencies (24, 36), in locking in a dominant design.  All three of these 
correspond to increases in synergistic specificity (18).  In the first case, the skills of the 
product designers and production engineers become specific to the particular design.  In 
the second, the entire production system becomes specific to that design.  In the third, the 
cognitive systems of the people involved with the product become aligned with the 
dominant design (24, 36, 37).  Later authors also see a role for network externalities built 
around ties to specific complementary assets (40), such as videotapes (30), typing schools 
(41), or the Unix operation system (42).  
The dominant design permits more stable and reliable relations with suppliers, vendors, 
and customers, and from the customer’s perspective, a dominant design reduces product-
class confusion and promises dramatic decreases in product cost (6).  All of these 
correspond, once again, to increased synergistic specificity.  In this case, it is between the 
product and suppliers and customers. 
Specific synergies are also the fundamental source of the core rigidities that prevent firms 
from responding to competitive threats posed by radically new technologies at the end of 
the cycle.  These rigidities might reside in the production system (6, 43) or in channels to 
customers (33).  After the radical new technology has broken through and transformed 
the industry however, the system is re-stabilized by the reintroduction of specific 
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synergies between the cognitive systems of product designers, skills and production 
systems of manufacturers, market channels, and the expectations of the market.   
The impact of modularity on drivers of the product lifecycle 
As we saw in the section above, the central assumption of product lifecycle theory is that 
systems evolve towards and are stabilized (or re-stabilized after radical innovations) by 
increasing synergistic specificity between the product, organization, competencies, 
production technology, suppliers, and customers, locked in by specialization, scale 
economies, embedded competencies, and network externalities.  In modular products, 
specific synergies between product elements have been eliminated.  In this section we 
examine how this affects specialization, scale economies, embedded competencies, and 
network externalities in the production system. 
With regard to specialization, there is considerable evidence that companies which pursue 
a modular strategy develop tremendous specialist expertise, both in the design and 
manufacturing of particular modules, and in the design of product architectures (44).  
However, that expertise does not lead to specific synergies between the organization and 
its competencies and production technology, but the opposite.  Because the product is 
modular, it becomes possible for the organization to modularize the group which either 
designs or manufactures it, even to the point of out-sourcing it.  Consequently, entire 
parts of the organization or its production technology can be substituted in and out 
without disrupting the rest of the organization.   
Modularization reduces the minimum efficient scale of production, and hence the specific 
synergies in two ways.  First, suppose an integrated product with a certain minimum 
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efficient scale was subsequently separated into two modules.  Each of those modules 
would have a minimum efficient scale that is smaller than or equal to that of the 
integrated product.  Consequently, the modular product has a minimum efficient scale 
less than or equal to that of the equivalent integrated product.  Second, because our 
integrated product is now modularized, it becomes possible to use the two modules in 
other products.  For instance, a flat-screen display can be attached to a television tuner as 
easily as to a computer.  Therefore, the minimum efficient scale for our production 
system may be quite different from the minimum production run for our product.  
Therefore, the scale of production is much more loosely coupled to the size of the market 
for a given product for modular products, and so specific synergies are much weaker. 
Modularization also undermines embedded competencies.  As a general rule, 
modularization forces organizations to make tacit knowledge explicit (44) in as far as that 
tacit knowledge is relevant to the interactions between modules.  Furthermore, the 
remaining embedded knowledge and associated competencies are confined within the 
boundaries of individual modules.  As such, they cannot pervade the entire organization.  
As a result, there is a much lower likelihood of specific synergies forming between 
particular sets of embedded knowledge and competencies and larger organizational, 
technological, and market systems.  
Finally, lock-in associated with network externalities results from specific synergies 
between particular products and complimentary assets in the marketplace (41).  In as far 
as those complimentary assets are substitutable; the extent of the lock-in is reduced.  
Modularization enhances substitutability.  For instance, VHS and Betamax could have 
co-existed just like electric and gas stoves (or 5.25” and 3.5” floppy drives) if people had 
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only used video-cassette recorders to play back home videos and to record and replay 
television shows (31).  VHS only triumphed decisively over Betamax when video rentals 
took off. Among other things, the need for store-owners to manage inventories meant that 
the specific synergies between the tape format and the VCR become much more 
important (31).  If the VCRs were modular however, and so manufacturers could simply 
substitute the VHS playing module for the Betamax playing module, while leaving the 
rest of the machine as it was, even that specific synergy would have become irrelevant. 
In summary, modularization serves to reduce, and in some cases eliminate the four 
principal drivers of lock-in for dominant designs -- scale economies, specialization, 
embedded competencies, and network externalities.  In the next section we examine how 
this undermining affects patterns of innovation and the dynamics of the product lifecycle.   
Innovations in Modular Systems and the Product Lifecycle 
The above sources of lock-in drive the progressive increases in synergistic specificity, 
through increasingly incremental and component-based innovation, which stabilize the 
entire value chain, notwithstanding occasional punctuations (4, 5) which are quickly 
stabilized.   If the sources of lock-in are removed, innovation can occur in both 
architectures and modules at once, and so we can expect a much more chaotic process 
(see Figure 2).  Innovation no longer stabilizes the system, but rather destabilizes it.  
Architectural, modular, and incremental innovations to either modules or architectures 
can happen in any order (see Figure 3).  Products might start with an architectural 
innovation, in which pre-existing modules are organized in a different architecture. This 
may create demand for many new modules.  For instance, the creation of a high-speed 
data port on personal computers opened up the market for external devices that could 
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process audio and video, and software to manage the content.  Skyscrapers facilitated the 
development of pads to isolate buildings from seismic forces (45).  Similarly, the creation 
of specific modules to fit these new architectures is likely to drive the creation of new 
products that can use those new modules.  For instance, the development of small motors 
and high-fidelity headphones for personal cassette players facilitated the invention of the 
personal radio, the personal CD-player, the personal MP3 player and the personal mini-
disc player. Elevators facilitated skyscrapers (46).  Alternatively, products might start 
with a modular innovation in which a new module is inserted into an existing 
architecture, as with CD players being added to Audio systems (25), and then find their 
way into a multitude of products, such as computers, as components.  They may also 
begin as a combination of both modular and architectural innovations, where a few 
modules are combined with old ones into a partially new architecture, as with the 
transition from analogue to digital home-video cameras.  
Insert Figure 2 about here  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Undermining the product lifecycle 
We saw above how modularization undermines the drivers of lock-in and creates 
possibilities for multiple types of innovation simultaneously.  We also saw how the 
product lifecycle model hinges on the establishment of the dominant design at the top of 
the product lifecycle and its dislodgement at the end.  We will now consider the impact of 
increased modularity on the establishment and dislodgement of the dominant design.     
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The “era of experimentation” leading to the establishment of a dominant design will 
decline in importance as products become more modular.  Because consumers and 
manufacturers can swap modules in a given architecture, experimentation can be 
relatively cheap.  If customers eschew certain features in a VCR, the manufacturer can 
stop including them.  If their voice recognition software does not work properly, 
customers can buy another package at low cost.  Meanwhile, their poor choice of 
program has not affected the rest of the functionality of their computer.  From this it 
follows that potential adopters are much less likely to await the emergence of an industry 
standard before purchasing a new product or installing a new process technology.  It also 
follows that the emergence of an industry standard will not be a prerequisite to mass 
adoption and volume production of a new generation of technology (see 6). 
The establishment of a dominant design marks a transition from competition between 
technical regimes to competition within a technical regime (6).  The more modular 
product systems become, the less likely such a transition will occur.  The innovative 
technology can simply be inserted, as a new module, in an existing architecture, such as a 
“Zip” drive inserted into a PC.  In addition to avoiding the transition, this increases the 
number of niches occupied by the given technology because it can be embedded into a 
number of different architectures.  For example, “Zip” drives can be incorporated in 
PC’s, laptops, workstations, and industrial robots.   It also makes the host architecture 
more flexible, and therefore able to occupy more niches (47).  As a consequence, a given 
design can dominate more spatial niches (48, 49) and more temporal niches.  A PC of the 
near future -- a very high-powered machine, possibly with a photonic processor, 
embedded in a network with input by voice and graphical manipulation, output to a flat-
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panel screen or the Internet, and storage on an optical disk – will have no parts in 
common, no physical resemblance, and few uses in common with the product from which 
it has evolved, the original IBM PC. Notwithstanding, the same “product” will have 
dominated the same “niche” for about 20 product generations.   
As products become more modular, dominant products will become less entrenched at 
the end of the cycle.  Because the dominant product is modular, it is possible for a new 
entrant to adopt many of the attributes of the existing product by purchasing modules 
from existing suppliers. Dell entered the PC market with an innovation in logistics and 
supply chain management but purchased all its hardware and components.  
In the conventional model, discontinuities can be driven by competence-enhancing or 
competence-destroying discontinuities, where “A competence enhancing discontinuity 
builds on know-how embodied in the technology that it replaces,” (6: 11) and strengthens 
the position of the incumbent, while a competence-destroying discontinuity does the 
opposite. With modular and architectural innovations, competence enhancement stops 
being as clear a concept.  The car example which opened this paper illustrates this.  
Vehicle manufacturers may well end up outsourcing their fuel cells to new companies, 
but this will enhance their ability, as manufacturers, to compete in the face of new 
environmental regulations.  Consequently, whether or not an innovation is competence 
enhancing or competence destroying depends on the role of the actor in the innovation 
network.4 
                                                 
4 In a recent article, Tushman and Murmann (37) argued that the advent of modularization did not change 
the logic of the product lifecycle.  Instead, they argued, the “product lifecycle logic” would be observed at a 
different level of analysis, namely within the module.  If they were correct, then all of the lock-ins 
associated with the product lifecycle could be destroyed simply by modularizing the module.  This 
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It is important to note that the above paragraphs speak of more and less modular 
products.  There are no perfectly modular products because there will always be a cost of 
substituting modules, and the brands associated with particular products have value, 
among other reasons.  These will serve to maintain a weak semblance of a product 
lifecycle.  Notwithstanding, a recent study of the Japanese domestic construction industry 
(50) provides an example of a mass-produced product which is close to the modular 
ideal.  About 20% of Japanese luxury single occupancy dwellings (houses) are produced 
in factories and assembled on site.   Interestingly, Toyota, the world leader in modular 
vehicle design and manufacturing, is one of the leading manufacturers, so we can assume 
that these manufacturers are very sophisticated.  In short, the market has rejected all 
attempts to produce standardized architectures (potential dominant designs) for houses.  
In fact, two of the three most successful manufacturers use architects as salespeople who 
customize the design with the client by modifying room-level modules.  None of the 
lock-ins which make the product lifecycle model theoretically useful are observed.  
Product lifecycles at the level of the components (if they exist) lead neither to product 
lifecycles at the level of the modules (room units) nor the product (houses).    
Discussion 
We have shown how modularization removes the synergistic specificity between 
components and this undermines the logic of the product lifecycle.  We discuss one key 
implication, that for the design of organizations and the configuration of industries.    
                                                                                                                                                 
undermines their argument.  Put differently, such an argument assumes that all important innovation occurs 
within the modules, and that innovations between them are irrelevant.   
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The optimal form of organization according to product lifecycle theory is the 
ambidextrous organization (37, 43).  Such an organization has discipline and rigidity to 
produce regular innovation during the convergent phases of the product lifecycle, and is 
able to reinvent itself and its products during the discontinuities.   
In contrast, if the fundamental driver of organization is interdependence (51), and 
modularization enables components to be decoupled, then efficient forms of organization 
for the design of modular systems will involve a meta-level organization to design the 
architecture and divide it into modules and decoupled units which design the modules 
(44).  Organizations which control the architectures of their products and produce them 
efficiently tend to adopt such a form and oscillate temporally between phases of 
architecture development and phases of module development for products, processes, and 
knowledge (44, 52-54). 
If products involve modules produced by different manufacturers, these two roles can 
involve two types of organization, one specializing in modules (module manufacturers) 
and the other specializing in aggregating modules and assembling them into final 
products (assemblers).  Each module manufacturer might supply a number of assemblers.  
Those assemblers might be in completely different markets, and so might interact with 
fundamentally different sets of module manufacturers.  In such a situation, the optimal 
form of industrial organization becomes a network of small firms, rather than a dominant 
manufacturer with subservient suppliers (25, 55-57).  Hence, we hypothesize that the 
Silicon Valley phenomenon would be strongest in industrial domains where 
modularization is practiced extensively.    
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In such an environment, we expect to see extensive entrainment of firms (58).  Consider 
two computer assemblers “D” and “C”.  Suppose that D pressures its module suppliers to 
produce new models by June and December, so it can release its new products at trade 
shows in September and March.  Because C will have access to the same new modules in 
June and December, it will then schedule its product releases for the same trade shows, 
and put pressure on its suppliers who don’t supply to D to deliver in June and December 
as well.  Those suppliers will put similar demands on third tier suppliers, and will make 
modules available to other assemblers, possibly outside the narrow sectors in which “C’ 
and “D” operate, e.g. “A”, pressuring them to release their products on the same 
schedule.  Once the market (e.g., the computer magazines) gets used to this schedule, it 
will build its own expectations.  Consequently, we can expect an entire complex of firms 
to be entrained into the same timing schedule.   
Finally, we are led to consider the definition of an industry.  If organizations, 
technologies, and markets are synergistically specific, then an industry can be defined as 
a group of companies "hanging off" a dominant design through particular market linkages 
and technical competencies (3, 59, 60)5.  So, for example, the “automobile industry” 
comprises vehicle manufacturers, their suppliers, and their distribution channels.  Once 
modules start to appear across significantly different architectures, technologies and 
markets become decoupled.  Whereas technology once defined industries, in a modular 
world, an industry has to be defined exclusively in terms of the product market.  This 
means that an industry is, at least to some extent, independent of a particular knowledge 
                                                 
5 It should be noted here that all the above show the conjunction of markets and technologies in industries 
with data that clearly predates modularization of product technology, Abernathy with mainly data from 
Ford, circa 1900-1935, Kogut et al. and Teece et al with pre-1970 data. 
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base of the manufacturers, but is dependent on the cognitive categorization systems (61, 
62) of consumers.  Industries move from being “in the making” to being “in the market”. 
(4407 words) 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Product lifecycle and patterns of 
technological innovation for integrated products
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Figure 2: Innovation rates for 
modular and integrated products
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Figure 3: Innovation dynamics for 
modular products
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